Islamic Imperialism A History by Efraim Karsh

Author:Efraim Karsh
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780300198171
Publisher: Yale University Press

“I do not think of myself as a leader of the Arab world,” he added a few years later. “But the Arab peoples feel that what we do in Egypt reflects their collective hopes and aspirations.”25

This recalls Sharif Hussein's 1918 comment that although the Arabs as a whole had not asked him to be their king, he was the only one who stood sufficiently above his peers to become king of pan-Arabia. Though Nasser, unlike Hussein, did not frame his ambition in such blatantly personal terms but rather spoke about Egypt as the only entity capable of leading the Arabs, there is little doubt that he viewed himself as the personification of Egypt. Openly contemptuous of political parties and institutions, Nasser argued from the moment of his political ascent that his mandate came from the people, which made him answerable only to them. Since the “people” could hardly express its wishes in the repressive police state that he created—with its terrifying security services, draconian legislation, outlawed political parties, and state-controlled media—Nasser quickly identified Egypt with his own persona, in speech and in thought, personalizing the national interest and nationalizing his personal interest.

While presenting his anti-Western policy as a Manichean struggle over Arab destiny, Nasser did not shy away from improving Egypt's relations with Britain and the United States whenever it suited his needs. In November 1954, at the height of his campaign to forestall the creation of the Baghdad Pact, he signed a $40 million economic assistance agreement with the United States. Nasser even implied that his virulent anti-Western rhetoric was a retaliation for what he considered an Anglo-American violation of a “gentleman's agreement” to place Egypt—that is, himself—in the driver's seat of inter-Arab politics, and their preference for his nemesis, Iraq's Nuri Said, in this role.26

The July 1956 nationalization of the Suez Canal offers a similarly vivid illustration of Nasser's instrumentalism. This clear act of self-interest, which enhanced Egypt's regional prestige and gave its fledgling economy a much-needed boost in the form of toll revenues worth in excess of 10 percent of the Egyptian national budget, was usefully transformed into an altruistic pan-Arab move aimed at eliminating the remnants of Western colonialism in the region. Nasser repeated the same trick four months later by presenting Egypt's crushing defeat by Israel in the Sinai Peninsula, and its rather lackluster military performance against a combined Anglo-French landing in Port Said, as a heroic defense of the “Arab nation” against Western imperialism. What his account blatantly ignored was that it was the United States that had saved Nasser's regime from assured destruction by forcing the invading forces to cease hostilities before achieving their objectives.

Nasser's approach to the organizations and institutions charged with promoting the pan-Arab cause was no less indicative of his equation of Arab unity with his own pre-eminence. The Arab League, originally viewed by Nasser as a corrupt and inept organization, was quickly transformed into an extension of Egyptian will, with many of its existing officials, including the secretary-general, being replaced by Egyptian nationals.

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